College of William & Mary Law School

William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository
Popular Media

Faculty and Deans

1983

The Enlargement of the Classified Information
System
Robert A. Rosenbaum
Morton J. Tenzer
Stephen H. Unger
William W. Van Alstyne
William & Mary Law School

Jonathan Knight

Repository Citation
Rosenbaum, Robert A.; Tenzer, Morton J.; Unger, Stephen H.; Van Alstyne, William W.; and Knight, Jonathan, "The Enlargement of
the Classified Information System" (1983). Popular Media. 20.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/popular_media/20

Copyright c 1983 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/popular_media

Academic

The

Freedom

and

Tenure

of the
Enlargement

ClassifiedInformation
System

This is the second of two reports, preparedby a subcommittee of CommitteeA on AcademicFreedomand Tenure
and approvedby the Committeefor publication,on the
subjectof federal restrictionson scientific research.The
first report, which appearedin the September-October
issue of Academe, dealt with restraints by government
officialson the free disseminationof nonclassifiedscientific ideas. Thefollowing reportexamines ExecutiveOrder 12356 (April 2, 1982), which prescribesa system for
classifying informationon the basis of national security
concerns. Commentsare welcome, and should be addressedto the Association's Washingtonoffice.
national government severely limits academic research in the United States in two
distinct ways.
The first of these was the subject of a
critical report in the September-October,
1982, issue of Academe: Bulletin of the AAUP. That
report discussed the network of statutes and regulations applicable to unclassified research, travel, and
publication. The conclusion of the report, similar to
that reached by several other national academic associations, was that the scope of such restrictions, as
written and applied, significantly abridges academic
freedom beyond the needs of national security. In
reviewing current restrictions on the sharing of research, exchange of scholars, and related means by
which American academic scientists can remain informed of developments within their disciplines, the
report also argued that insofar as academic freedom
is improperly curtailed, the nation's security is illserved: barriers to learning from others, and concern
that innovative work may be suppressed whenever
its originality might be useful even to the industrial
or technological progress of other nations, are necessarily discouraging to the maintenance of research
leadership within the United States. The relatively
arbitrary prerogative of the government to forbid the
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circulation of research, itself unclassified, was a principal part of the report's criticism.
Recent events have tended to justify that criticism.
A university professor submitted two papers for
presentation, and subsequent publication, to the
twenty-sixth Annual Technical Symposium of the
Society for Photo-Optical Instrumentation Engineers,
meeting in San Diego in August, 1982. The professor's
research was supported by a grant from the Air Force.
The research was not classified, consistent with the
university's stated policy "to undertake only those
research projects in which the purpose, scope, methods, and results can be fully and freely discussed."
As he had done routinely in the past, the professor
also sent the papers to the program officer in the Air
Force. A week before the papers were scheduled for
presentation, the professor was told by the Air Force
officials that his papers had not been "cleared" and
therefore they should not be presented to the symposium. The professor withdrew the papers and did
not attend the meeting in San Diego. Some three
months later the papers were "cleared" by the Department of Defense.
Our critical report on the large variety of threats to
unclassified research postponed a review of the classification system itself until this report. Nonetheless,
the implication of our earlier report was to favor a
limited classification system, to the extent that such
a system may minimize uncertainty and provide a
less random threat to academic freedom.
Certain research conducted in universities may
have (and sometimes does have) immediate and direct
national security implications. Some of that work is
undertaken pursuant to Department of Defense contracts. Universities generally recognize that such arrangements may compromise their commitment to
academic freedom, and they vary in their policies
respecting the wisdom and acceptability of such
arrangements. The AAUP has thought it inappropriate to condemn faculties and universities for mak9a

ing such arrangements per se, but it has regularly
expressed concern that inconsistency with academic
freedom is a genuine danger which all academic
institutions should weigh carefully in the research
and restrictionsthey accept.
In this respect a clearand circumspectclassification
system may be both important and helpful. Ideally,
a properclassificationsystem will provide reasonable
certainty as to what research and publication must
necessarily be treated in confidence, according to
needs of national security that are plain and compelling. It will enable universities and their faculties to
make informed decisions about their research. Very
different,and stronglyobjectionable,is a classification
system that sweeps within it virtuallyanything conceivably useful industrially, technically, or militarily
to at least someone, administeredby officials placed
in a position where virtually any doubt must move
them to classify (to avoid having to answer for
appearingtoo cavalierabout nationalsecurity).When
laid alongside a network of criminalstatutes and ad
hoc regulations that serve to inhibit broadly unclassified research as well, such a classification system
magnifies hazards to academic freedom. It must
compound the problems of universities in making
principled decisions and threaten the capacity of
scholarsand scientists in the United States to advance
the frontiersof knowledge.
Here we review briefly recent changes introduced
into the classification system by Executive Order
12356, issued by President Reagan on April 2, 1982.
A recent report of the National Academy of Sciences
Panel on ScientificCommunicationand National Security, a report we think sensitive and sound, concludes that open and free scientificcommunicationis
essential for ensuring long-term national security.1
We agree. We believe the enlargement of the classificationsystem contemplatedin ExecutiveOrder12356
is seriously mistaken. It poses an unwarrantedthreat
to academicfreedom and hence to scientificprogress
and the national security.
I. Summaryof Recent Changes
ExecutiveOrder 12356is the most recent presidential
executive order prescribing a system for classifying
and declassifyinginformationon the basis of national
security concerns. President Franklin Roosevelt issued the firstsuch orderin 1940.Succeedingexecutive
orders were signed by Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, Nixon, and Carter. In their details, these
earlierexecutive orders differed from one another on
such mattersas what informationwas to be classified,
for what period of time, and according to what
standards.Theirsimilarities,however, are more noteworthy than their differences. They sought to preserve the public's interest in the free circulationof
knowledge by limiting classification authority, by
defining precisely the purposes and limits of classi1
Excerpts from the report of the National Academy of Sciences
are reprinted below as an appendix to this report.
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fication, and by providing procedures for declassification.
By contrast, Executive Order 12356 significantly
broadens the authority of government agencies to
classify informationas secret. It removes a previous
requirement for classification that damage to the
national security be identifiable. It resolves doubts
about the need to classify in favor of classification.It
permits indefinite classification. It provides for reclassification of declassified and publicly released
information.It expands the categoriesof information
subject to classification to include nonclassified research developed by scientific investigators outside
the government.
II. Main Provisions
The preamble to Executive Order 12356 states that
the "interests of the United States and its citizens
require that certain information concerning the national defense and foreign relations be protected
against unauthorized disclosure." To prevent "unauthorized disclosure," the order establishes three
levels of classification: "top secret," "secret," and
"confidential." The standards for "top secret" and
"secret"are the same as in previous executiveorders.
However, Executive Order 12356 omits the earlier
qualifyingword "identifiable"in describingthe damage to the national security that can justify classification at the lowest, or "confidential,"level. The text
reads: "confidential shall be applied to information,
the unauthorized disclosure of which reasonably
could be expected to cause damage to the national
security." At a congressional hearing, a deputy assistant attorney general explained the deletion of the
requirementof "identifiability"as follows:
Every new qualifieror adjective, such as "identifiable,"
added to the requirementof showing "damage"or any
other requisite element of proper classification,raises
new uncertaintiesor areas of ambiguitythat may lead
to litigation. . . .[T]he requirementof "identifiable"
damage may be construed to suggest that disclosure
must cause some specific or precise damage, a requirement that the government might not reasonablybe
able to meet in some cases. . . . Provisionsof such
orders should be simple, general, less complex and
requireno more precision than the subjectmatterreasonably allows. The requirementof "identifiable"damage fails on all these counts.

In the event that a government officialis uncertain
about whether to classify information,the doubt will
be resolved in favor of classificationpending a final
determinationwithin thirtydays. In addition, if there
is doubt about the level of classification, the informationwill be classifiedat a higherlevel, also pending
a final decision within thirty days. Once information
is classified, it can remain so at the discretion of
government officials "as long as requiredby national
security considerations." There is no provision in
Executive Order 12356 for justifying the need for
classificationbeyond a stated periodof time (President
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Nixon's executive order called for automatic declassification after thirty years, unless the government
determined that continued classification was still
necessary and set a time for eventual declassification;
President Carter's executive order established a sixyear declassification period), and the order is silent
as to whether declassifying information is generally
desirable.
If information has been declassified, it may be
reclassified under Executive Order 12356 following
the requirements for classification. Information which
has been properly declassified and is in the public
domain apparently may remain "under the control"
of the government (the order defines information as
"any information or materials . . . that is owned by,
produced by or for, or is under the control of the
United States Government") and thus can be reclaimed by the government.
The executive order provides for limitations on
classification. It states that "basic scientific research
information not clearly related to the national security
may not be classified." Early drafts of the executive
order had not included this provision, which appears
in the executive order issued by President Carter.
Protests from the scientific community and others led
to its retention. However, as will be discussed later,
it is not clear what this limitation actually safeguards.
Sanctions for violations of the executive order may
be imposed on the government's "contractors, licensees, and grantees."

III. Comments
Basic national security obviously requires some classification of information as secret. It is also obvious
that freedom to engage in academic research and to
publish the results is essential to advance knowledge
and to sustain our democratic society. The possibility
for friction between classification and academic freedom is always there. Secrecy, an inescapable element
in classification, is fundamentally inconsistent with
open inquiry. The friction can be reduced if classification is invoked before research has begun and is
cautiously applied for a limited period of time and
only to matters of direct military significance.
Classification defeats its own purpose, however, if
it imperils the freedoms it is meant to protect. In our
judgment, Executive Order 12356 does exactly that.
It gives unprecedented authority to government officials to intrude at will in controlling academic research that depends upon federal support. The order
permits and encourages the classification of information merely on the speculative assertion that its
open dissemination might damage the national security. The classification may be imposed at whatever
stage a research project has reached and can be
maintained for as long as the government deems
prudent. Academic research not born classified may,
under this order, die classified.
The provision in the Executive Order that "basic
scientific research information not clearly related to
ACADEME
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the national security may not be classified" carries
the suggestion that basic scientific research may be
classified if the government determines it to be "clearly
related to the national security." This standard for
classification is looser still than "could be expected
to cause damage to the national security." We may
be reading too much into this provision; we hope
that it will be interpreted simply as an exemption
and nothing more. Unfortunately, even with the most
favorable gloss the exemption strikes us as a weak
safeguard for scientific inquiry. Under Executive Order 12356, information "produced by or for" the
government is subject to classification, and sanctions
may be imposed on government "contractors and
grantees" who violate the executive order. There is
an exemption from classification for "basic scientific
research not clearly related to the national security,"
yet the government official who cannot fix a clear
relationship but nonetheless has doubts could still
classify funded or contracted research consistent with
other provisions of the executive order. Considering
the emphasis placed on classification in the executive
order, it seems all too likely that uncertainty will be
resolved in favor of restraints.
Academic researchers require freedom and security
to take the risk of occasionally being wrong. In their
pursuit of knowledge they should not have to look
backward either in hope of favor or in fear of disfavor.
However, in an era of reduced federal support for
research except in the area of national security, and
with investments in research programs and facilities
significantly reliant upon federal funding already
having been made, the academic researcher is under
enormous pressure to submit to classification no
matter how restrictive or apparently arbitrary the
demand. The adverse effects on academic freedom
and thus on the advancement of knowledge and on
the national security can be grave.
The executive order can inhibit academic researchers and research institutions from making long-term
intellectual investments in research projects that are
potentially classifiable. It can serve to foster unnecessary duplication of research efforts. It is likely to
encourage reluctance to share research methods and
results with professional colleagues because of uncertainty as to whether something that a government
official can call harmful to the national security may
be unwittingly revealed. There is the bleak prospect
of academic researchers who are walled-off from each
other, either by classification or by the worry that it
might be imposed, thus forestalling mutual enrichment through the exchange of ideas and constructive
criticism. Those in government concerned with the
uses of new knowledge are not likely to obtain the
benefit of the widest possible evaluation of their plans
and projects. All these consequences of the executive
order are likely to be felt outside as well as within
the field of research in which classification is imposed.
The government has not put forward any compelling reasons for instituting a system of classification
that is so at odds with previous systems. The government's own reports, including reports issued by
the Department of Defense, seriously question the
lia

cost, effectiveness, and need for more classification.
These reports draw particular attention to the dangers
of overclassification.
Executive Order 12356 requires drastic revision if
it is to be tolerable to a community of higher learning
committed to academic freedom. The application of
the order to nonclassified information, which is already subject to potential restraints under existing
laws and regulations, is at best superfluous. The
heavy emphasis on classification is misplaced: the
provision for reclassification should be removed, and
the standards for classification rewritten so that they
do not sweep unnecessarily broadly.
If the government's executive order or its successor
continues to deny due recognition to the need of the
independent research scholar for academic freedom,
the cost will be borne not only by the researchers
who are affected but by the nation as a whole.

Commenting on the prepublication text of this report,
Richard G. Stilwell, deputy in the Office of the
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, provided a
detailed reply which included the following points:
report takes issues with the deletion of the
word "identifiable" from the damage test for
assignment of the Confidential security classification. It should be noted that this word was not
used in previous Executive orders other than the one
signed by President Carter. Its deletion in the current
Order does not change the way in which people
classify nor does it change what may be classified.
Executive Order 12356 continues the two-step classification process. An original classification authority
must first determine that information being considered for classification falls within one of the several
categories of information that are classifiable. Only
upon an affirmative determination that the information is classifiable may the classification authority
proceed to the second step. That step involves a
determination that unauthorized disclosure of the
information would or would not cause a degree of
damage to the national security. In making that
determination, one naturally must envision what
damage, if any, reasonably could be expected to
occur. Thus, a decision to classify at the second step
inherently involves identification of the damage.
Your report states, in essence, that when there is
doubt regarding whether information should be classified, the new Executive Order requires classification.
Similarly, the report indicates that when there is
doubt about the level of classification, the Order
requires classification at the higher level. In fact,
Executive Order 12356, and the Department's implementing Regulation, specify that when in doubt,
safeguardthe information as though it were classified
or classified at the higher level until a classification
12a
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decision is made (within thirty days). "Safeguard" as
used here is quite distinct from classification. The
terms are not synonymous and should not be confused.
There is concern expressed that the new Executive
Order is silent on whether declassifying information
is generally desirable. However, the Order does state
that "information shall be declassified or downgraded
as soon as national security considerations permit."
Moreover, the Order itself provides for declassification in three distinct ways, namely, through the
setting of dates or events for automatic declassification, systematic review for declassification, and mandatory review for declassification. What has been
removed are artificially set time limits for automatic
declassification. What remains is provision for automatic declassification when it can be determined.
It is true that information that has been disclosed
may be reclassified under the terms of this Order but
only if it may reasonably be recovered. Within the
Department of Defense, only four officials, the Secretary of Defense and the Secretaries of the three
Military Departments, may exercise this authority. I
think that we can agree that classification of information that is broadly held by the public only serves
to strain the credibility of the security classification
system. But, it is the intent of the new Order to
recognize that the government, in limited circumstances, should be able to reclassify information that
has been released incorrectly or inadvertently but
only to a few people who then can be contacted and
agreement reached concerning the sensitivity of the
information.
The report recognizes that basic scientific research
not clearly related to the national security cannot be
classified. However, the report permits readers to
conclude that there exists a lesser standard for the
classification of such information. Let me assure you
ACADEME

1983
January-February

that this is not correct; the Order expressly prohibits
classification of basic scientific research not clearly
related to the national security. Moreover, Defense
regulations stipulate that the classification of basic
scientific research would be appropriate only if the
information concerns an unusually significant scientific breakthrough and there is sound reason to believe
that the information is not known and it supplies the
United States an advantage related directly to the
national security.
In summary, I think it fair to characterize this Order
not as a drastic departure from past practice but rather
as a practical approach to the security needs of

government. The trend toward openness in government had run virtually uninterrupted for the past
thirty years. It was a trend that the Department of
Defense supported over those years and it long has
been the Department's policy not to constrain information the public requires to be informed sufficiently
about the activities and operating functions of the
Department. However, Executive Order 12065 treated
classification almost as an evil to be avoided at all
cost. The new Executive Order seeks to redress this
imbalance and provide a more even approach to the
issues of protection versus openness.

APPENDIX

Reportof the National Academy of Sciences
Panel on Scientific Communicationand National Security
Principles for University Research
The Panel concludes that the vast majority of university
research, whether basic or applied, should be subject to no
limitations on access or communications.
Undoubtedly, some things must, by their very nature,
be kept secret. It is clearly important, for example, to keep
secret those properties of actual weapons systems that
would enable a potential enemy to develop effective countermeasures. Where specific information must perforce be
kept secret, it should be classified strictly and guarded
carefully. The decision to accept or reject classified research
projects or to establish off-campus classified facilities is a
matter to be decided by universities.
The Panel concludes that there are a few gray areas of
research that are sensitive from a security standpoint, but
where classification is not appropriate. These research areas
are at the ill-defined boundaries between basic research
and application and are characteristic of fields where the
time from discovery to application is short. At present, a
portion of the field of microelectronics is the most visible
among the small handful of such new technologies.
Guidelines for Classified

and Gray-Area Research

While it is impossible to specify classified and gray-area
research with precision, there are some broad criteria that
help to define the few areas in question.
The Panel recommends that no restriction of any kind
limiting access or communication should be applied to any
area of university research, be it basic or applied, unless it
involves a technology meeting all of the following criteria:
The technology is developing rapidly, and the time
from basic science to application is short;
The technology has identifiable direct military applications; or it is dual-use and involves process or production-related techniques;
Transfer of the technology would give the U.S.S.R. a
significant near-term military advantage; and
The United States is the only source of information
about the technology, or other friendly nations that
could also be the source have control systems as secure
as ours.
ACADEME
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In order to specify the areas where greater control would
be appropriate, it may be useful to look at some examples
of research that do not meet all of the above four criteria.
Monoclonal antibody research is developing rapidly, and
the interval from basic discovery to application may be
short; but there appears to be no way in which this research
could result in a significant military advance. Hence, there
should be no need to impose controls in this field. Similarly,
the science underlying aerodynamic design, even though
it possesses obvious military significance, is a mature,
slowly evolving field that is unlikely to provide any significant near-term military advantage to the Soviets. Thus, it
too should be free of controls.
The Panel recommends that if government-supported
research demonstrably will lead to military products in a
short time, classification should be considered. It should
be noted that most universities will not undertake classified
work, and some will undertake it only in off-campus
facilities.
In those few cases of government-sponsored research
where national security considerations may require restrictions on publication, limitations on foreign access to facilities, or security classification, the Panel believes that certain
guiding principles and procedures should be followed. The
provisions of EAR [Export Administration Regulations of
the Department of Commerce] and ITAR [International
Traffic in Arms Regulations of the Department of State]
should not be invoked to deal with gray areas in government-funded university research. Rather, in the Panel's
view, appropriate procedures should be incorporated in
research contracts or other written agreements in those
rare cases where some measure of control is required. The
advantages of such provisions are that they give prior notice
to the researcher that the funded research may turn out to
have national security significance and foster a spirit of
negotiated accommodation that helps prevent future misunderstandings about the researcher's obligations and recourse.
The Panel recommends that in the limited number of
instances in which all of the above criteria are met but
classification is unwarranted, the values of open science
can be preserved and the needs of government can be met
13a

by written agreements no more restrictive than the following:
a) Prohibition of direct participation in governmentsupported research projects by nationals of designated
foreign countries, with no attempt made to limit physical access to university space or facilities or enrollment
in any classroom course of study. Moreover, where
such prohibition has been imposed by visa or contractually agreed upon, it is not inappropriate for government-university contracts to permit the government to
ask a university to report those instances coming to the
university's attention in which the stipulated foreign
nationals seek participation in such activities, however
supported. It is recognized that some universities will
regard such reporting requests as objectionable. Such
requests, however, should not require surveillance or
monitoring of foreign nationals by the universities.
Restrictions on access to nonclassified research,
whether to research results or to physical facilities, are
outside the normal operating procedures of research
universities. It is, of course, within the power of the
government to deny or issue conditional visas to foreign nationals who are believed to be seeking skills or
technical data that will significantly damage our national security. In extraordinary circumstances, the government may seek to ensure that government-provided
resources are not used to support nationals of specified
countries who seek to work in specified programs. Access to program resources by nationals of designated
foreign countries may be limited either through research contract terms or through other agreements negotiated with particular universities. Such contracts or
agreements should not attempt to deny physical access
to any university space or facility to any person accepted by the university into its community. The danger to national security lies in the immersion of a suspect visitor over an extended period of time, not in
casual observation of equipment or research data.
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b) Submission of stipulated manuscripts simultaneously to the publisher and to the federal agency contract officer, with the federal agency then having sixty
days to seek modification in the manuscript. The review period is not intended to give the government the
power to order changes: the right and freedom to publish remain with the university, as they do with all
unclassified research. This does not, of course, detract
from the government's ultimate power to classify in
accordance with law any research it has supported.
In some cases, a contractual agreement providing for
simultaneous review of manuscripts at the time of their
submission to scientific journals may be appropriate. A
requirement for government comment within sixty days of
submission of the manuscripts should provide adequate
time for the government to assess the potential near-term
military significance of the dissemination and to reach
accommodation with the researcher before public release.
Experience suggests that disagreements about publication
can almost always be resolved between the principal investigator and the technical contract manager. The Panel
emphasizes that its support for a review period is not
intended to support any government effort to veto publication, or to limit the government's power to classify, in
accordance with law, any research it has supported.
To help government policy officials to supervise the
application of the gray-area research criteria and to gain
perspective on the longer-term effects of the restrictions
imposed on such research, there is a need to ensure that
an accurate accounting of such restrictions is kept.
The Panel recommends that in cases where the government places such restrictions on scientific communication
through contracts or other written agreements, it should
be obligated to record and tabulate the instances of those
restrictions on a regular basis.
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